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Reinforce for perform.ance: The 
need to go beyond pay and 
even rewards 
Fred Luthans and Alexander D. Stajkovic 
Executive Overview 
Perhaps the most talked about, if not actually implemented. practical solution for 
making human resources more productive is pay for performance. Yet many researchers 
and practitioners doubt the true effectiveness of this approach. To help solve this 
controversy. we suggest drawing from reinforcement theory and behavioral management. 
This approach can be used to explain the simple statements: You get what you reinforce. 
but you do not necessarily get what you pay for. We first critically review the traditional 
pay for performance practices and address the question of whether rewards. not 
reinforcers. do more harm than good. Next, we discuss the theoretical foundation that you 
get what you reinforce. Finally. we outline the behavioral management steps of 
organizational behavior modification (O.B. Mod.). When O.B. Mod. has been 
systematically applied over the years using both monetary and nonmonetary reinforcers. 
our recent meta-analysis found that performance on average increased 17 percent. The 
contingencies and practical implications of this behavioral management approach that 
advocates reinforce for performance instead of payor even reward for performance are 
discussed. 
Management practitioners, professors, and stu-
dents identify two major issues going into the 21st 
century: globalization and information technology. 
As an afterthought. most will also cite the impor-
tance of people in gaining competitive advantage. 
While considerable deserved attention is being 
given to developing global strategies and informa-
tion systems, the human side of enterprises still 
tends to be slighted or given a low priority. As 
Pfeffer notes in his recent book. The Human Equa-
tion: "Rather than putting their people first, numer-
ous firms have sought solutions to competitive 
challenges in places and means that have not 
been very productive-downsizing and outsourc-
ing in a futile attempt to shrink or transact their 
way to profit. and doing myriad other things that 
weaken or destroy their organizational culture in 
efforts to minimize labor costs-even as they re-
peatedly proclaim, 'people are our most important 
assets'."1 Some recent widely publicized debacles 
that depict what Pfeffer is talking about include 
such well-known firms as Boeing Aircraft, which 
was caught shorthanded in filling customer orders, 
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and the Union Pacific Railroad, which experienced 
a severe decline in performance and safety. 
This is not to say that people are the answer to 
everything, nor that areas such as information 
technology are not important. There is little ques-
tion that IT can lead to improvements not only in 
productivity, but in such areas as better customer 
service. For instance, the use of hand-held comput-
ers by Hertz and Avis lot attendants eliminated 
lines at check-in and return counters. It can also 
resul t in cost savings such as software that allows 
customers direct access through the Internet to find 
the status of packages. This procedure saved 
FedEx an estimated $16 million in its first year. 
The development and innovative application of 
IT. however, may not be sufficient in sustaining 
competitive advantage. As Bill Gates argued in 
reaction to the Justice Department's antitrust case 
against Microsoft. little of today's technology is 
proprietary.2 Technology is easily obtained and 
replicated and only levels the playing field. An 
organization's valued human assets cannot be 
copied. As one executive put it: "Machines do not 
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make things, people do."J Rapidly advancing tech-
nology makes human resources even more critical 
to organizational success. Similarly, the general 
manager of Boise Cascade observed: "Capital and 
machinery make it possible, people make it hap-
pen."4 
For sustainable competitive advantage going 
into the 21st century, human resources are still the 
major force for creating distinctive core competen-
cies.0 As the CEO of Chrysler (now Daimler-Chrys-
ler) succinctly stated: "The only way we can beat 
the competition is with people."6 The real chal-
lenge is to find ways to manage human resources 
as effectively as possible in order to attain world-
class performance. 
The real challenge is to find ways to 
manage human resources as effectively 
as possible in order to attain world-class 
performance. 
The alternatives offered to enhance employee per-
formance are not always discernable or easy to 
implement. Finding out and replicating what 
makes Southwest Airlines able to turn around 80 
percent of its flights in 15 minutes, while other 
airlines on average need 45 minutes, can be a 
difficult assignment, since at Southwest the man-
agement of human assets is a very complex dy-
namic process.7 This article offers a practical solu-
tion for effective human resources management 
that is relatively easy to implement and has been 
proven to work. The approach we propose is based 
on reinforcement theory and is systematically and 
simply applied through the steps of organizational 
behavior modification, or O.B. Mod.8 The effective-
ness of this behavioral management approach 
was recently supported by our comprehensive 
analysis of 20 years of empirical evidence.9 
The basis of the behavioral approach is that 
employee behavior is a function of its contingent 
consequences. Something that strengthens and 
leads to an increase in the frequency of a behavior 
is called a reinforcer, not a reward. Behaviors that 
positively affect performance must be contingently 
reinforced rather than indiscriminately rewarded. 
Pay is by far the most recognized reward in human 
resource management. and pay for performance is 
closely equated with a reward system. 
Pay for Performance 
With some exceptions, most of the evidence re-
garding the effectiveness of pay for performance is 
based on survey data, anecdotal testimonials, and 
one-time company cases.lO This has resulted in 
mixed and even confUSing guidelines of how, 
where, and even if. to use pay for performance to 
improve employee performance. 
Traditional Approach 
Incentive pay approaches can be traced to Taylor's 
scientific management at the beginning of the cen-
tury. Traditionally, these pay-for-performance 
plans have been associated with piece-rate sys-
tems for blue-collar factory workers, commissions 
for salespeople, and merit payor bonuses for su-
pervisors and managers. 
Most organizations today use some type of re-
ward system based on pay. For example, a recent 
survey of Fortune 1000 firms found that a majority 
of organizations used monetary reward systems, 
and another survey reported that 80 percent of U.S. 
companies use some form of merit pay.ll Most re-
cently, with the recognition and use of work groups 
and teams, gain sharing plans have become in-
creasingly popular. 
New Pay for Performance 
With the latest emergence of process-based, net-
work organizations and knowledge workers, a new 
pay-for-performance framework has emerged. Ed-
ward Lawler, who is most closely associated with 
compensation and reward systems, cautions that 
"the new pay is not a set of compensation practices 
at alL but rather a way of thinking about the role of 
reward systems in a complex organization."12 
Compensation experts Patricia Zingheim and Jay 
Schuster have identified several specific new pay-
for-performance techniques:13 
1. Commissions beyond sales to customers. As 
with all the new pay plans, the commissions 
paid to sales personnel would be aligned with 
the organization's strategy and core competen-
cies. The commission may be determined by 
customer satisfaction andfor sales team out-
comes such as meeting revenue or profit targets. 
2. Rewarding leadership effectiveness. This newly 
emerging technique is based on factors beyond 
the financial success of the organization. In par-
ticular, it may include an employee satisfaction 
or commitment measure to recognize a manag-
er's skills in handling people. 
3. Rewarding new goals. This approach rewards 
all relevant employees who contribute to such 
goals as customer satisfaction, cycle time, or 
quality measures. 
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4. Pay for knowledge workers in teams. With the 
increasing use of teams, pay under this ap-
proach is linked to the performance of knowl-
edge workers or professional employees who 
are organized into reengineering, product devel-
opment, interfunctional. or self-managed teams. 
5. Skill pay. This technique recognizes the need for 
flexibility and change by paying employees 
based on their demonstrated skills rather than 
the jobs they perform. Although it is currently 
used with procedural production or service 
skills, the challenge is to apply this concept to 
the more varied, abstract skills needed in the 
new paradigm organizations, such as develop-
ment of cross-cultural communication skills, 
6. Competency pay. This approach rewards the 
more abstract know ledge or competencies of 
employees, such as those related to technology, 
the international business context. customer 
service, or social skills. 
New pay goes beyond rewarding the number of 
products, services or sales revenues and profits. It 
puts monetary rewards on customer service, lead-
ership, employee satisfaction, cycle time, quality, 
teams, skills, and competencies. 
New pay goes beyond rewarding the 
number of products, services or sales 
revenues and profits. It puts monetary 
rewards on customer service, leadership, 
employee satisfaction, cycle time, 
quality, teams, skills, and competencies. 
Evidence of the Effectiveness of Pay 
for Performance 
Both traditional and new pay techniques have 
largely depended on testimonial evidence and 
questionnaire responses for evaluation. 14 Although 
a few methodologically rigorous empirical studies 
on merit payl.o and gainsharing l6 note the prob-
lems and complexities of pay for performance, the 
literature is still dominated by mostly glowing re-
ports coming from survey information. A compre-
hensive survey sponsored by the American Com-
pensation Association (ACA) placed a dollar value 
on the positive impact of pay for performance tech-
niques. It found a 134 percent net return; i.e., for 
every $1 of payout, a gain of $2.34 was attained,l7 A 
recent survey of 400 British and 100 American firms 
found that those using pay for performance had on 
average over twice the shareholder returns of 
those with low variable pay.IS Although these find-
ings appear impressive. we still lack experimen-
tally derived causal evidence that would indicate 
more effective guidelines for application. 
The new pay techniques have no direct empiri-
cal research to date. and support for their perfor-
mance depends on testimonies and anecdotal ev-
idence. Carol De La Cruz, vice president of human 
resource development for AT&T Credit. said of her 
firm's new pay plan: "We expect to see significant 
productivity gains in the organization in the years 
to come."19 A recent survey sampling Fortune 1000 
firms concluded: "Companies using reward inno-
vations tend to view them as successful. "20 
Since the effectiveness of both traditional and new 
pay-for-performance techniques has depended on 
such evidence, many questions remain about their 
application. 
Do Rewards Really Work? 
An unconvinced few still support the position that 
rewards do more harm than good. Alfie Kahn. au-
thor of Punished by Rewards, declares that "any 
incentive or pay-for-performance system tends to 
make people less enthusiastic about their work 
and therefore less likely to approach it with a com-
mitment to excellence."2l He unequivocally states: 
"The bottom line is that any approach that offers a 
reward for better performance is destined to be 
ineffective."22 These statements are largely based 
on Kohn's own assumptions, and are in stark con-
trast to a large body of reinforcement theory that is 
backed by empirical research. In contrast, Albert 
Bandura insightfully notes that "social scientists 
who warn that high pay will ruin the interest and 
motivation of ... workers, rarely counsel low re-
ward of professional services and creative ef-
fortS."23 
Edward Deci and his colleagues conducted widely 
publicized laboratory experiments in the 1970s that 
found that rewards decreased subjects' intrinsic 
motivation, task interests, and creativity.24 These 
controversial findings have generated considerable 
follow-up research. with mixed results. 25 
A comprehensive review of about 100 relevant 
studies over the past two decades found a number 
that indicate that some rewards may have a detri-
mental effect. and an equal number of studies that 
found no effect. or a positive effect,26 Another re-
view of 96 studies found that the only detrimental 
effect of rewards was the time spent carrying 
out laboratory activity following a performance-
independent or noncontingent reward.27 
A recent review of studies accumulated over a 
quarter of a century concluded that: (l) the detri-
mental effects of rewards occur under highly re-
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strict ed, easily avoidable conditions; (2) mecha-
nisms of instrumental and classical conditioning 
are basic for understanding incremental and det-
rimental effects of reward on task motivation; and 
(3) positive effects of rewards on performance are 
easily attainable using procedures derived from 
behavioral theory.28 
You Get What You Reinforce 
Although cognitively-based arguments have been 
used extensively to counter pay for performance, 
reinforcement theory has not necessarily been 
used to support it. Yet even such pioneers of the 
cognitive approach to organizational behavior as 
Victor Vroom recognize that "without a doubt the 
law of effect or principle of reinforcement must be 
included among the most substantiated findings of 
experimental psychology and is at the same time 
among the most useful findings for an applied 
psychology concerned with control of human be-
havior."29 A brief review of reinforcement theory 
can serve as a useful point of departure for a be-
havioral management approach to pay for perfor-
mance. 
Reinforcement Theory 
Reinforcement theory had its beginnings in Pav-
lov's conditioning experiments and has evolved 
through Skinner's operant conditioning to Bandu-
ra's social learning and social cognitive theory.3D 
Its basic premise, that human behavior is a func-
tion of contingent consequences, has survived 
stormy debates over the past 30 years. As Bandura 
forcefully points out in his book on social cognitive 
theory: "If people acted ... on the basis of informa-
tive cues but remained unaffected by the results of 
their actions, they would be too insensible to sur-
vive very long."31 When this premise is applied to 
the workplace, it yields the concept that you get 
what you reinforce. 
Today's organizations may have visionary strat-
egies, networks, team-based designs, and the lat-
est advanced information technologies in place, 
but unless organizational participants are rein-
forced for their performance-related behaviors, 
these strategies, designs, and technologies may 
have little impact. In fact, empirical evidence sup-
porting reinforcement theory has long established 
that the antecedent cues, such as strategies, de-
signs, technologies and even leadership styles, 
have the capability to direct employee behavior 
only if reinforcing contingent consequences are 
forthcoming. As one behavioral management con-
sultant points out: "A company is always perfectly 
designed to produce what it is producing. If it has 
quality problems, cost problems, productivity prob-
lems, then the behaviors associated with those 
undesirable outcomes are being reinforced. This is 
not conjecture. This is the hard, cold reality of 
human behavior."32 
A major challenge for today's management is to 
recognize this behavioral reality. As Steven Kerr 
pointed out in his classic article on "Rewarding A. 
While Hoping for B,"33 reinforcers currently main-
taining the dysfunctional behaviors must be elim-
inated and the functional performance behaviors 
must be reinforced. As we are suggesting, rein-
force, not necessarily reward or pay. for perfor-
mance. 
In suggesting that you get what you reinforce 
and that managers should reinforce and not nec-
essarily reward or pay for performance. we are 
recognizing two major premises from reinforce-
ment theory. The first is that a reinforcer is not 
the same as a reward. A reward is something that 
is perceived as valuable by the reward giver, 
whereas a reinforcer always increases the 
strength and frequency of the desired functional. 
performance-related behaviors. Thus. not every re-
ward is a reinforcer, but every reinforcer is a re-
ward. Second, by reinforcing we mean systematic 
application of reinforcement theory are outlined in 
the procedures of the O.B. Mod. approach to behav-
ioral management. 
The O.B. Mod. Approach 
The O.B. Mod. model. shown in Figure 1. represents 
a problem-solving, analytical. and action-oriented 
approach to identifying and contingently manag-
ing critical performance-related behaviors of par-
ticipants in all types of organizations. It provides 
managers with a systematic. easy-to-apply behav-
ioral management framework to identify, analyze, 
and modify employees' behaviors for performance 
improvement. Most succinctly. the O.B. Mod. model 
can be summarized by five one-word steps: iden-
tify, measure. analyze, intervene, and evaluate.34 
The first step of the O.B. Mod. application model 
is to identify critical observable performance-
related behaviors. These behaviors must be ob-
servable and performance-related. Since not every 
behavior accounts for an equal portion of the vari-
ance in performance outcomes. the behaviors must 
be critical to the task in question. The guideline is 
to identify the 20 percent of critical behaviors that 
account for about 80 percent of the performance 
outcome. 
The second step of the O.B. Mod. model is to 
measure the baseline frequencies of the critical 
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behaviors identified in step one. Although there 
are many ways to record frequency of the re-
sponse, the key is to reliably record frequencies of 
occurrence. Because of their unobtrusiveness and 
reliability, archival records tend to be a desirable 
source of data for measuring behavioral outcomes 
such as quality or productivity. However, trained 
observers can also directly record behavioral fre-
quencies. Baseline frequencies of the critical be-
haviors should be displayed in a graph when pos-
sible, such as frequency over time. 
The next step of the O.B. Mod. model is to ana-
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lyze the behavioral antecedents and contingent 
consequences in the performance-related context. 
This analysis attempts to answer two questions: 
(l) What are the antecedents of the critical perfor-
mance-related behavior identified and measured 
in the first two steps? and (2) What are the contin-
gent consequences for desired behavioral re-
sponses? Antecedents of the critical performance-
related behavior must be identified in the 
functional analysis in order to determine what fac-
tors cue the behavior or set the occasion for the 
behavior to be emitted. Examples of antecedents 
include variables such as equipment. technologi-
cal processes, job design and/or performance 
training. If the antecedents are not present, the 
employee cannot exhibit the behaviors. However, 
the key to the whole approach is the contingent 
consequences since the antecedents assume only 
stimulus control properties in the presence of rein-
forcing contingent consequences. Thus, identifying 
the reinforcing contingent consequences of the 
critical performance-related behaviors is the most 
important process in this analysis step of the O.B. 
Mod. model. 
After the functional analysis, an intervention is 
applied to increase the frequency of functional per-
formance behaviors or decelerate dysfunctional 
behaviors. The intervention strategies involve con-
tingently administered positive reinforcers to ac-
celerate functional behaviors. and extinction-or, 
as a last resort, punishment-of dysfunctional be-
haviors in order to decrease their frequency. The 
extinction and punishment interventions are al-
ways followed by positive reinforcers of the behav-
iors that are now moving in the functional direc-
tion for performance improvement. 
The final step of the O.B. Mod. model is to test the 
effectiveness of this behavioral approach to perfor-
mance improvement. An empirical evaluation of 
performance outcomes is conducted to determine 
whether the intervention did, in fact, lead to be-
havioral change, performance improvement, sus-
tained learning, and a positive affective reaction 
on the part of the organizational participant. Al-
though determining the behavioral change, learn-
ing, and reaction are important for the overall 
evaluation of the O.B. Mod. approach. the most 
important question is whether the intervention 
strategy did indeed lead to performance improve-
ment in observable and measurable terms. Charts 
of behavioral frequency are most frequently used 
in behavior modification to evaluate the difference 
between baseline and treatment conditions. Quan-
titative analysis. using appropriate statistical 
tests, should also be used to quantitatively test for 
the effectiveness of the O.B. Mod. application. 
Evidence of the Effectiveness of O.B. Mod. 
O.B. Mod., using a reinforce-for-performance 
premise, has been applied and researched over 
the years in a wide variety of manufacturing, ser-
vice, and not-for-profit organizations, and even 
across cultures.3s A recent meta-analysis of all the 
empirical findings of the research on the O.B. Mod. 
model over the past 20 years examined two major 
questions: (1) What was the average treatment ef-
fect on task-performance across all examined stud-
ies? and (2) Did any variables systematically mod-
erate the relationship between reinforcement 
contingencies and performance?36 
The study indicated an impressive 17 percent 
average improvement in performance. This in-
crease represents a greater gain in performance 
improvement than, for example, those obtained 
from meta-analysis of approaches such as goal 
settingY The study also revealed that two vari-
ables-type of organization and type of reinforce-
ment intervention-significantly moderated the re-
lationship between the O.B. Mod. applications and 
task performance. Table 1 shows a brief summary 
of the meta-analytic results transformed into per-
Table 1 
P..-ceJ1tage PedOllll~ bnpJ'Oftmemm. MamdQc:t\l.l"b1g QJ1d Service Org-cmimtiOllS Acc:ording to 
Different Types of O.B. Kod. Re1Dforcers 
Pfif.~. l8_,~~" '-1i1t~ 'limmi~ SimuJicmeoua ~
Typttof Overall M~ F~qft A~og. ~of uppU~of appU~of 
~ EfMct (ij OJ) am HEll Diem LlLlem 
Mcmuf&ctllriBg .33% 3ft. 41~ NlA N/A 41~ 44~ 
Serrice 13% 14~ 6% lS~ 3O'K. 3O'K. 9% 
Note 1. ()y~1 ~ven"l11 of O;J. Mod,. in tli1"lJll\l ofpeJ"formanc:e impro~ent regardlYl\l of typi) of organizatlon and r&nuorc:er 
1111 17 perc:ent.Tbel"e$Ultlll arIi ~ frotnt~Sfaj50vie and Luthans tnettt-am:dy. cited m end.r1ote 9. 
Note 2. All perc:en~ pl'esen:tedmthistttble ore,Msed em t~value of the Wlbiased average effect size statistic (d.> (from Hedges 
ana OIkin's 1_ meta-cmaiy;sis hooJI) respeeti:vely for ~ _egory. All d. <: .OS statistical signifk:anc:e. 
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centages and classified according to type of organ-
ization and type of reinforcement intervention. 
The meta-analysis found that the magnitude of 
the relationship between O.B. Mod. applications 
and performance could be first distinguished de-
pending on the type of organization. The average 
increase in performance-33 percent in manufac-
turing and 13 percent in service organizations-is 
important for practicing managers, since the ser-
vice sector has reached almost 80 percent of the 
U.S. economy and is still growing. The difference 
in application effectiveness of a.B. Mod. between 
manufacturing and service organizations could be 
explained in two ways: (1) the definition and accu-
rate assessment of performance outcomes; and 
(2) the nature of the employee behaviors and work 
processes involved in the delivery of performance 
outcomes. The first point refers to the difference 
between the definition and measurement of the 
more vague and complex service organization per-
formance outcomes (e.g., customer satisfaction, 
return business) versus tangible performance 
outcomes (e.g., productivity and quality) in manu-
facturing organizations. The second point refers to 
the difference between specifying service delivery 
employee behaviors and processes and the em-
ployee behaviors and processes that go into mak-
ing a tangible product. Service performance be-
haviors and outcomes are more complex and less 
identifiable than those found in manufacturing 
organizations. 
The results in Table 1 indicate that different O.B. 
Mod. reinforcement interventions, including mon-
etary and non-financial such as performance feed-
back, and social recognition and attention, tend to 
produce different gains in performance both in 
manufacturing and service organizations. The O.B. 
Mod. performance feedback intervention involves 
providing objective, usually graphed information 
about the employee's performance behaviors. Ex-
amples are frequency of performing preventative 
maintenance, but most often data are obtained 
from manufacturing archival productivity and 
quality. This feedback contingently administered 
as an O.B. Mod. reinforcement intervention to em-
ployee performance behaviors follows the guide-
line of being positive, immediate, graphic, and 
specific. The social reinforcers as an a.B. Mod. 
intervention involve trained supervisors and man-
agers providing verbal or written recognition (e.g., 
"I saw that you stayed past quitting time to finish 
that important project I gave you at the last 
minute") and attention ("I noticed that you were 
helping the new guy out when I passed your work 
station"). These social reinforcers do not praise or 
thank people for doing assigned duties or coming 
to work on time. They are contingently adminis-
tered to employee behaviors identified in the first 
step as critical to performance improvement. 
All three of these O.B. Mod. reinforcement inter-
ventions produced significant results. However, 
some of these effects were not statistically differ-
ent from each other. For example, in manufactur-
ing organizations, although the simultaneous ap-
plication of monetary, performance feedback, and 
social reinforcers produced the strongest effect on 
performance, the size of that effect was not statis-
tically different from the effect produced by the 
performance feedback alone. Also, the effect for 
monetary reinforcers was not statistically different 
from the one for performance feedback. 
Based on these findings, it does not appear cost-
effective for human resource managers to spend 
extra time and financial resources to simulta-
neously apply monetary, performance feedback 
and social reinforcers, when non-financial rein-
forcers alone produce the same results. 
Based on these findings. it does not 
appear cost-effective for human resource 
managers to spend extra time and 
financial resources to simultaneously 
apply monetary. performance feedback 
and social reinforcers. when non-
financial reinforcers alone produce the 
same results. 
Although pay has been found to be a reinforcer, not 
just a reward, in the O.B. Mod. approach, other 
reinforcers of performance feedback and social 
recognition and attention appear to be as effective. 
Table 1 also indicates that service organizations 
varied in performance while using the O.B. Mod. 
interventions. Non-financial interventions, such as 
performance feedback, produced the weakest. but 
still statistically significant, results in service or-
ganizations. However, when social reinforcers of 
attention and recognition are used in combination 
with performance feedback, and monetary and 
performance feedback reinforcers are applied to-
gether, these combinations produced the strongest 
effects on task performance in service organiza-
tions. To complicate matters further, the effects of 
monetary reinforcers were not statistically differ-
ent from those produced by social reinforcers. In 
service organizations, as in manufacturers, the 
same effects on performance can apparently be 
obtained by applying social reinforcers as by ap-
plying costly financial ones. 
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When simultaneous application of monetary re-
inforcers, performance feedback. and social atten-
tion and recognition was statistically compared 
with simultaneous application of nonfinancial re-
inforcers and social attention and recognition, the 
latter produced significantly stronger effects on 
performance. It appears that when monetary rein-
forcers are used in combination with feedback and 
social attention and recognition, the costly rein-
forcer may have actually diminished the effect of 
the whole intervention. In fact performance im-
provement decreased from 30 to 9 percent. 
Conclusion 
As with any scientifically-based approach, sound 
theory and basic research provide the foundation 
and point of departure for more effective applica-
tion. Many areas of organizational behavior and 
human resource management most notably self-
efficacy38 and goal setting. but also areas such as 
job design. have followed and draw from theory 
and research in order to make more effective ap-
plications. Pay for performance has not. Reinforce-
ment theory, through the O.B. Mod. process imple-
mentation, now supported by the meta-analytic 
results of 20 years of research, can provide the 
needed foundation and contingency guidelines for 
more effective application of pay for performance. 
Specifically, both the management literature 
and real-world experience indicate that there may 
be less than satisfactory results with the tradi-
tional pay-for-performance reward system. Rein-
forcement theory and meta-analytic research re-
sults indicate the problem may be in the way the 
system has been applied and managed. Reinforce-
ment theory would say that pay may be a reward, 
but not necessarily a reinforcer. and our meta-
analysis found that monetary. nonfinanciaL social 
and the combined reinforcers tend to yield differ-
ing impacts on performance. The implication for 
practice is that the feedback and social reinforcers 
may have as strong an impact on performance as 
pay. 
The implication for practice is that the 
feedback and social reinforcers may 
have as strong an impact on performance 
as pay. 
Before concluding that pay is somehow not as 
important as it was thought to be. or, even worse, 
reexperiencing the controversy initiated by Deci's 
research many years ago. two important points 
must again be emphasized: 0) pay can signifi-
cantly increase performance. yet (2) pay is not the 
only, nor necessarily the best. reinforcer for perfor-
mance improvement. For example, a large firm 
with two manufacturing facilities recently imple-
mented the O.B. Mod. approach using monetary 
incentives in one of the plants, and supervisors' 
feedback and social recognition and attention in 
the other. Performance improved using all three 
types of reinforcers-money, feedback, and social. 
In a service-sector application, bank supervisors 
used contingently administered feedback and so-
cial recognition and attention reinforcers for teller 
customer service behaviors. This included using 
the customer's name. providing a balance, and 
making eye contact. These behaviors led to in-
creases in measured customer satisfaction. In this 
same bank, the earlier use of monetary rewards 
had had no measurable effect on customer satis-
faction. The money turned out to be a reward, not a 
contingently administered reinforcer that strength-
ened teller customer service behaviors or produced 
customer satisfaction. The feedback and social 
recognition and attention contingently adminis-
tered by the supervisors through the O.B. Mod. 
approach was indeed a reinforcer for the tellers 
because it had the intended effect of increasing 
customer satisfaction. 
Based on the theory and research evidence put 
forth in this article, we suggest that you may get 
what you reward, but you do get what you rein-
force. Thus, a more comprehensive and effective 
application guideline for performance improve-
ment would be: Reinforce for performance. Pay for 
performance may not always lead to performance 
improvement. but reinforcing for performance will 
always improve performance. 
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